Poor protection of private properties has limited the access to bank loans by private enterprises in developing and transition economies. Under those circumstances, private entrepreneurs have resorted to various ways of enhancing the de facto protection of private properties. Using a data set of 3,073 private enterprises in China, this paper empirically investigates the impacts of political participation and philanthropic activities -informal substitutes for the lack of formal protection of private properties -on the access to bank loans.
Property Rights Protection and Access to Bank Loans:
Evidence from Private Enterprises in China
Introduction:
Academic research and policy experimentation over the past twenty-five years has led to an increasing consensus on the importance of private sector development in developing countries (Perotti, 2004) . Private entrepreneurs have played a central role in the transition of formerly planned economies to market economies . Both the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have made their assistance to the developing and transitional economies conditional on the privatization of the state sector.
Despite its importance, however, private sector development has been hampered by limited access to external finance. 1 In general, private firms first use internal capital (such as retained profits) for development as it does not involve the information asymmetry problem associated with external finance. But as internal capital is often limited, especially for entrepreneurial firms, external finance provides a much-needed additional source of capital. More importantly, external finance facilitates efficient allocation of capital (Levine, 1997) . 2 External finance is crucial to the development of private firms that are short in internal capital but have great investment prospects, and it also increases and illuminates the opportunity cost of misallocation of capital for those private firms that are rich in internal capital but hold poor investment prospects.
1 In most developing and transition economies, financial markets are rudimentary, and external finance is often restricted to bank loans. 2 See Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff (2002) , and Cull and Xu (2005) for the importance of external finance in transition economies.
Access to bank loans by private enterprises in developing and transitional economies has been plagued not just by the standard information asymmetry problem but, more crucially, by the poor protection of private properties. A common feature of the developing countries is the lack of formal protection of private properties, which could well be the reason for the underdevelopment in those countries. 3 In the transition economies, private sector development was not even permitted until some twenty-five years ago, and legal protection of private property has yet to stand the test of time. Private property, when poorly protected, is subject to expropriation by various parties in the society, and the access to bank loans by the private enterprises is adversely affected. Furthermore, private enterprises also face discrimination. This is because in many developing and transition economies the public sector remains dominant (Todaro and Smith, 2003) . Mindful of its inefficiency vis-à-vis the private sector, the public sector may lobby the government for enacting discriminatory policies, including lending policies, against the private enterprises (Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff, 2002) .
A case in point is China. Before China initiated economic reform in 1979, its economy was virtually all state-owned. Unlike some formerly planned economies in East Europe and the Former Soviet Union that had mass-privatization of state-owned enterprises, China has taken a gradual approach to reforming its state-owned enterprises 4 (Bai, Li, Tao and Wang, 2000; Bai, Lu and Tao, 2006) . By 2000, after twenty years of economic reform, China still had a sizable public sector. Throughout
China's reform process, there has been favoritism toward the state sector development 3 There is a large literature on the importance of property rights protection for economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 1995; Mauro, 1995; Svensson, 1998; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001; Claessens and Laeven, 2003) . 4 The number of state-owned enterprises declined from 1.547 million in 1992 to 1. example, Wei and Wang, 1997; Brandt and Li, 2003; Bai, Li, Qian and Wang, 2004 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our data set, and construct the variable about the access to bank loans by private enterprises. In Section 3, we develop the main hypothesis about how political participation and philanthropic activities -the informal substitutes for the lack of formal protection of private properties -may alleviate the access to bank loans. The impacts of formal protection of private properties and the information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers are controlled for. In Section 4, we present the main results of the empirical analysis. The paper concludes with Section 5.
Access to bank loans by China's private enterprises
Our data come from a survey of private enterprises in China First, the total number of private enterprises to be surveyed was decided. Second, for each of the 31 regions in China, six cities/counties were selected, which included the capital city, one district-level city, one county-level city, and three counties. Third, the number of private enterprises to be surveyed in every region was the product of the percentage of the region's number of private enterprises in the national total with the total number of private enterprises in the survey. Throughout the economic reform in the past twenty-five years, the Chinese government has refrained from privatizing its inefficient state-owned enterprises on a massive scale. One rationale for this gradual reform approach is that maintaining inefficient state-owned enterprises is a second-best way of providing social stability, which is beneficial to all firms operating in the national economy (Bai, Li, Tao and Wang, 2000; Bai, Lu and Tao, 2006 Protection of private property depends on both good laws and strong enforcement. 6 In the case of China, though the constitutional amendment was made in 2004 for the protection of private property, the enforcement varies from province to province (Cull and Xu, 2005) . In the absence of formal protection of private properties, there could be risks of expropriation and discrimination, which make it difficult for private entrepreneurs to secure bank loans. Knowing the ultimate cause for the difficult access to bank loans -the lack of formal protection of private properties, entrepreneurs could alleviate the problem by enhancing the de facto protection of their private properties. As pointed out by McMillan and Woodruff (2002) , in transition economies, laws are often non-existent or not enforceable, and entrepreneurs cannot rely on the legal system to secure protection of private properties. Instead they resort to informal substitutes for the missing market-supporting institutions.
Causal observations in China suggest that entrepreneurs with higher social status enjoy better de facto protection of their private properties. Presumably, expropriation of and discrimination against private enterprises would cause much more bad publicity and increase costs for the instigators if the owners of the private enterprises have higher social status. It is also possible that entrepreneurs with higher social status have more opportunities to interact with government officials, directly and indirectly influencing the implementation of government policies with respect to the protection of private properties.
Private entrepreneurs can improve their social status through political participation and philanthropic activities. We first focus on the effect of private entrepreneurs' political participation on their access to bank loans. There is an emerging literature regarding the impacts of political connections on firm performance (Fisman, 2001; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Faccio, 2006; Faccio, Masulis and McConnell, 2005; Khwaja and Mian, 2005) . A general finding of this literature is that politically connected firms enjoy better yet undeserved treatments from the governments or financial institutions than those without. In the case of China, however, private enterprises are in general discriminated against, and those whose owners are more politically active are conjectured to have better and deserved access to bank loans. Regarding the impacts of firms' philanthropic activities on their access to bank loans, the theoretical analysis of Shleifer and Vishny (1994) suggests possible back-door deals between politicians and firms: firms donating money to projects favored by politicians in return for easy access to bank loans. Our hypothesis again posits that disadvantaged private entrepreneurs in China donate money to achieve higher social status and secure better de facto protection of their private property, hence having better and deserved access to bank loans.
Protection of private property
There is a large literature regarding the impact of property right protection on the access to external finance (see, for example, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff, 2002; Cull and Xu, 2005) . Though the main hypothesis of this study is about the impacts of political participation and philanthropic activities on the access to bank loans, it is important to control for the effects of property rights protection.
Private property, when poorly protected, is subject to expropriation by various parties in the society and particularly by government officials (Bai, Li, Qian, and Wang, 2004) . In China, local government officials may impose informal levies on private enterprises to supplement their fiscal revenues, and they may even extort bribes for personal gains.
In general, when private enterprises face higher risks of expropriation, banks are less willing to lend them money, thereby making their access to bank loans more difficult (the supply side effect). 8 The demand side story is more complicated. On the one hand, with higher risks of expropriation, private enterprises have less incentive for investment and hence lower demand for bank loans. On the other hand, as Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff (2002) , and Cull and Xu (2005) argue, in the presence of expropriation, private enterprises prefer external finance to internal finance for further development, though the incentive for further development itself has been weakened.
Overall, the supply side effect seems the dominant effect for private enterprises in China, 9 and we have the following control for the empirical study:
Control 1: It is more difficult for private enterprises to get bank loans if they face greater risk of expropriation (such as firms paying higher informal levies and/or facing more serious corruption problems).
Two variables are constructed to capture the risks of expropriation faced by private enterprises. The first one is a dummy variable, denoted by Informal Levy, which takes a value of one if the answer to the survey question "whether a private enterprise has paid any informal levies" is "yes" and zero otherwise. 10 The second variable is also a dummy variable, denoted by Corruption, which takes the value of one if the answer to the survey question "whether it is necessary to apply stricter anti-corruption policies than the existing ones" is "yes" and zero otherwise.
In addition to the risks of expropriation when private properties are not securely protected, private enterprises may also encounter all kinds of discrimination as compared with their state-owned counterparts. As argued by McMillan and Woodruff (2002) , an inefficient yet dominant state sector has both incentives and means to lobby for discriminative policies against the private sector development. The scope of discrimination can be very broad, covering almost all aspects of business operation, such as restrictions on market entry and exit, limited access to infrastructure services, and lack of detailed information on government policies. Thus we have the following control for the empirical study: and philanthropic activities, we will also have regressions without Control 1 or 2.
Information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers
It is well known that access to bank loans is complicated by the information asymmetry problem existed between lenders and borrowers. The information asymmetry problem, which is generic to financial markets in both developed and developing countries, is especially severe for private enterprises in China. It was only 11 In the survey, questions about discrimination were asked and answered using state-owned enterprises and foreign invested enterprises as references, respectively. Thus two indices could be constructed accordingly. However, the correlation between these two indices is 0.72, which shows that private enterprises in China are discriminated against, as compared with both state-owned enterprises and foreign invested enterprises. In our analysis, for any particular aspect of business operation, a private enterprise is said to be discriminated against if the entrepreneur of this enterprise replied affirmatively to the survey question with regard to either state-owned or foreign invested enterprises.
twenty-five years ago that China's private sector started to emerge with new establishment and privatization of state-owned enterprises. Thus most of China's private enterprises are smaller and younger than their state-owned counterparts and are at higher risk in the eyes of lenders. In addition, with weak protection of private properties, private enterprises in China tend to disguise their actual performance, making it difficult for lenders to screen the loan applications (Cai, Liu, and Xiao, 2004 ). Thus we would like to control for the information asymmetry problem in our analysis on the access to bank loans.
Three methods have been identified for solving the information asymmetry problem.
The first method is that of appraisal, namely, through an objective evaluation by experts. One of the most commonly used appraisal schemes in the financial markets is the rating of firms by independent credit rating agencies. If the rating is objective, then it should help firms get access to bank loans. Notice that there could be some self-selection bias, i.e., only those private enterprises that have a chance of getting bank loans may choose to have independent credit rating. To control for the selfselection bias, we can focus on a sub-sample consisting of only private enterprises with credit ratings, and examine if the level of rating has any effect on the access to bank loans. To summarize:
Control 3 (appraisal): (i) Access to bank loans is easier for private enterprises that are rated by independent credit rating agencies. (ii) Among private enterprises that are rated by independent credit rating agencies, those with higher credit ratings are expected to have easier access to bank loans.
Two independent variables are thus constructed. The first variable is a dummy variable (denoted by Independent Credit Rating) regarding whether the enterprise has independent credit rating, and it takes the value of one if the answer is yes and zero otherwise. The second variable, denoted by High on Credit Rating, is a dummy variable, restricted only to those firms that have independent credit rating, and it takes the value of one if the credit rating is "A" and zero otherwise.
The second method for alleviating information asymmetry is signaling, namely, those actions taken by more informed parties to credibly convey the superior information they possess. In the case of securing bank loans, a private enterprise can signal its capability to carry out projects successfully and its willingness to repay loans by adopting a better financial and management control system. Other characteristics of the enterprise also contain useful signals about the enterprise's ability and willingness to repay loans, for example, the size of its operation, the years of managerial experience of its owner, the capital labor ratio (a proxy for collateral), and the return on assets. Although these characteristics are not necessarily chosen by the enterprise for the purpose of sending signals about its private information, we still classify them as signals to facilitate our exposition. To summarize, we have: 1997-1999. Notice that banks in smaller cities/counties or regions with higher percentages of nonstate-owned financial institutions may be less discriminatory against private enterprises, which makes access to bank loans easier for those private enterprises.
Control 4 (signaling): (i) Access to bank loans is easier for private enterprises that adopt higher-quality financial and management control systems. (ii) Access
However, since we control for policy discrimination faced by private enterprises (i.e.,
Control 2), the endogeneity problem in Control 5 can be mitigated to some extent.
Summary statistics of the dependent variable and independent variables used in this study are listed in Table 1 . Table 2 shows the correlation between these variables.
The main results
As the dependent variable for the access to bank loan takes values 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, the ordered logistic regression method is used in the main regression analysis (Greene, 2003) . Ordinary least square method is also used mainly for showing the relative quantitative importance of the various determinants of the access to bank loans.
We first focus on the main hypothesis regarding the impacts of political participation and philanthropic activities on the access to bank loans. As shown in column 1 of Table 3 , the coefficient of CPC Member is negative and statistically significant at 1% level, while that for CCPCC Member is negative as predicted but statistically that by conducting more philanthropic activities private entrepreneurs can have easier access to bank loans. Overall, the econometric analysis as summarized in column 1 of Table 3 lends strong support to the main hypothesis regarding the informal substitutes for the lack of formal protection of private properties.
Next we control for the formal protection of private properties (i.e., controls 1-2). As shown in column 2 of Table 3 , our main results on political participation and philanthropic activities remain intact, while the coefficients of the variables controlling for the formal protection of private properties are as predicted. The coefficients for both Informal Levy and Corruption are positive and statistically significant at 1% level. They imply that private enterprises paying higher informal levies face more difficulty in getting bank loans, and so do those facing more serious corruption. These results support Control 1. The coefficient of Discrimination is positive and significant at 5% level, which means private enterprises encountering more severe policy discrimination also have more difficulty in accessing bank loans, supporting Control 2.
Third, we control for the information asymmetry problem (Controls 3-5) and test the robustness of the impacts of political participation and philanthropic activities on the access to bank loans. As shown in column 3 of Table 3 , our main hypothesis remains strongly supported, and the coefficients of those variables controlling for the information asymmetry problem are as predicted. Independent Credit Rating has a negative coefficient with 1% statistical significance, suggesting that independent credit rating helps private enterprises in accessing bank loans and lending support to Control 3(i). Size of Establishment and Capital Labor Ratio both have negative coefficients with 1% statistical significance. These results suggest that access to bank loans is easier for those private enterprises with larger scale of operation or with more physical assets that can serve as collateral for bank loans, supporting part of Control 4.
Both Internal Control and ROA have the predicted negative coefficients though statistically insignificant, which suggests that better internal control or higher return on assets has limited effects on the access to bank loans. 13 Managerial Experience has a positive yet statistically insignificant coefficient, possibly because the experience prior to the economic reform may not be meaningful and furthermore the managerial labor market has yet to be developed.
Percentage of Loans by Non-State Banks and
Located in Small City both have negative coefficients with 1% statistical significance.
That is, access to bank loan is easier for private enterprises that are located in regions with higher percentages of non-state-owned-banks loans and for those that are located in small cities or counties. These results lend strong support to Control 5. 13 Return on assets is an informative variable in a well developed market. However, in the case of China where protection of private properties was not even written into the constitution until March 2004, private entrepreneurs were reluctant to reveal their rates of returns to the survey teams. Thus this variable is not expected to have significant explanatory power.
When control is made for both formal protection of private properties (Controls 1-2) and the information asymmetry problem (Controls 3-5), our main results still hold as shown in column 4 of Table 3 though the statistical significance decreases for some of the variables. For the ease of showing the relative quantitative importance of the various determinants for the access to bank loans, the ordinary least square method is used to repeat the analysis of Table 3 and the results are summarized in Table 4 .
Before concluding our analysis, we carry out three more sets of regressions, mostly for checking the robustness of our main results. First, to control for the possible selfselection bias that better-performing firms may choose to have an independent credit rating, we focus on the rating results as a more refined variable of appraisal. As shown in column 1 of Table 5 , our mains results on political participation and philanthropic activities still hold. Second, given that poor protection of private property may affect both the demand for and the supply of bank lending, we consider a sub-sample comprising of only firms that wish to borrow money to focus on the supply side. As shown in column 2 of Table 5 , our main results on both political participation and philanthropic activities still carry through. Finally, to better control for the effect of information asymmetry on the access to bank loan, we focus on those private enterprises that had borrowed from the banks. Generally speaking successful borrowing history helps resolve information asymmetry in bank lending. Again, as shown in column 3 of Table 5 , the main results on political participation remain valid, while some of the variables related to information asymmetry become less significant as expected.
Conclusion
Private sector development has been identified as a driving force in the growth of the developing and transition economies. Despite its importance, however, private sector Note：***, **, *, + indicate significant at 1%, 5%, 10％, and 15% levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
